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Recent ethical decision-making models suggest that individuals’ own view of their
morality is malleable rather than static, responding to their (im)moral actions and
reflections about the world around them. Yet no construct currently exists to represent
the malleable state of a person’s moral self-image (MSI). In this investigation, we define
this construct, as well as develop a scale to measure it. Across five studies, we show
that feedback about the moral self alters an individual’s MSI as measured by our scale.
We also find that the MSI is related to, but distinct from, related constructs, including
moral identity, self-esteem, and moral disengagement. In Study 1, we administered the
MSI scale and several other relevant scales to demonstrate convergent and discriminant
validity. In Study 2, we examine the relationship between the MSI and one’s ought versus
ideal self. In Studies 3 and 4, we find that one’s MSI is affected in the predicted directions
by manipulated feedback about the moral self, including feedback related to social
comparisons of moral behavior (Study 3) and feedback relative to one’s own moral ideal
(Study 4). Lastly, Study 5 provides evidence that the recall of one’s moral or immoral
behavior alters people’s MSI in the predicted directions. Taken together, these studies
suggest that the MSI is malleable and responds to individuals’ moral and immoral actions
in the outside world. As such, the MSI is an important variable to consider in the study
of moral and immoral behavior.
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INTRODUCTION
Evidence of unethical behavior is widespread in society. From violations of psychological contracts
(e.g., Kotter, 1973) to lying and deception (e.g., Lewicki, 1983), various forms of unethical behavior
permeate modern life, creating both economic, and reputational costs. For many years, most
empirical research on morality was dominated by the notion that there were stable, individual
differences in moral behavior (e.g., Kohlberg, 1971; Colby et al., 1983; Kohlberg et al., 1983).
However, contrary to the popular view that unethical behavior is just a matter of “a few bad apples,”
a rich body of recent literature demonstrates that even people who care about being moral (that is,
those who have a high moral identity; Aquino and Reed, 2002) often engage in unethical behavior
(for a recent review, see Bazerman and Gino, 2012). This research also argues that individuals’ own
perceptions of their morality is dynamic and malleable, and can influence subsequent behavior
(Goldstone and Chin, 1993; Monin and Jordan, 2009; Shalvi et al., 2015): at any moment in time,
social and situational factors may swing one’s moral self-view. In the current investigation, we
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propose the construct of the moral self-image (MSI), defined as
a person’s dynamic and malleable moral self-concept, to provide
insight into this malleability of moral self-perceptions. We also
propose a scale to measure the MSI. Across five studies, we
demonstrate that this scale responds to feedback from the social
world and people’s reflections of their own moral behavior. By
proposing the construct of the MSI, we hope to clarify how social
and intrapersonal events, such as ethical and unethical behavior,
shape people’s views of their moral selves and how the state of
their moral selves can affect their subsequent behaviors.
THE DYNAMIC AND MALLEABLE NATURE
OF MORALITY
People engage in unethical actions on a daily basis, much more
often than they care to admit (DePaulo et al., 1996; Schweitzer
et al., 2004; Mazar et al., 2008; Gino et al., 2009; Shalvi et al.,
2011). At the same time, they strive to maintain a positive
self-concept both privately and publicly (Allport, 1955; Jones,
1973; Rosenberg, 1979; Adler, 2006). In fact, people wish to
view themselves as moral beings (Steele, 1988; Dunning, 2007;
Monin and Jordan, 2009) and take steps to maintain this belief
when they behave immorally (Mazar et al., 2008; Monin and
Jordan, 2009; Barkan et al., 2012; Shalvi et al., 2015)—even
when these steps involve sacrificing gains or investing valuable
resources (Murnighan et al., 1993; Dunning, 2007). According to
recent research, when people act morally, their self-perception of
their own morality is strengthened, allowing them to relax their
subsequent moral strivings and engage in immoral actions. In
contrast, after individuals act immorally, they seek to strengthen
this self-concept by engaging in moral actions (Sachdeva et al.,
2009; Jordan et al., 2011). Thus, the extent to which one’s
perceived morality “measures up” appears to be an important
influence on actual (im)moral behavior.
This apparent discrepancy between people’s perceived actual
and ideal MSI leads to a dynamic and malleable perception of
one’s moral self: at any given moment, individuals may answer
the question “How moral am I?” differently (Monin and Jordan,
2009; Moore and Gino, 2013). We label the answer to this
question as a description of a person’s MSI.
RESEARCH CALLING FOR THE MSI1
Within the rich body of research on the “self ” (both the general
and moral self), significant research proposes that the dynamics
of the moral self explain immoral and moral behavior, yet no
validated tool has been provided to measure this process (Zhong
and Liljenquist, 2006; Sachdeva et al., 2009; Barkan et al., 2012;
Mulder and Aquino, 2013).
For example, in their research on moral cleansing, Zhong and
Liljenquist (2006) discuss the need for people to cleanse themoral
self following an immoral act due to the need to self-complete via
symbolic actions (Wicklund and Gollwitzer, 1981). The authors
discuss that the need to do a good deed following a bad one is
1The literature has used other labels for what we refer to as the moral self-
image, from moral self-concept (Mazar et al., 2008; Sachdeva et al., 2009) to moral
self-worth (Sachdeva et al., 2009).
motivated by a desire for “restoration or completion of the moral
self ” (p. 1452); however, they do not measure the moral self nor
provide empirical evidence that engaging in this type of deed
actually affects people’s moral selves.
In a similar vein, Mulder and Aquino (2013) demonstrate that
people—particularly those with a high centrality of moral traits
(i.e., a high internalized moral identity)—engage in behaviors
that help to, “maintain their self-image as a moral person in the
aftermath of a dishonest act” (p. 219). Mulder and Aquino find
that following cheating, people who hold moral traits to high
self-importance will engage in compensatory moral behavior.
Although, they do not measure actual changes in one’s self-image,
they propose that this pattern is a consequence of a desire to
“uphold a moral self-image” (p. 219) and reduce the discomfort
of violating one’s MSI.
Sachdeva et al. (2009) suggest that a person’s need to boost
the MSI (or what they term the “moral self-worth” and “moral
self-concept”) is responsible for compensatory patterns of moral
behavior: “That is, when moral self-worth is threatened, moral
cleansing restores the moral self-concept, and when moral self-
worth is too high, moral licensing allows the agent to restrict
moral behavior and return to a more comfortable level” (p. 524).
Across a series of three studies, they find that when people write
stories about themselves that affirm or threaten their MSI, they
then act in opposing directions on subsequent tasks: a flattering
story is followed by less moral behavior and an unflattering story
is followed with more moral behavior. They also find that these
effects do not occur if the story is written about someone else,
suggesting that it is moral self -image that is at play, though this
possibility is not empirically explored.
In a nuanced examination of the influences on dishonest
behavior,Mazar et al. (2008) propose that people will be dishonest
for self-gain—but only to the extent that dishonesty does not
threaten their MSI. Mazar and colleagues use several paradigms
in which people have the opportunity to cheat. Across five
studies, they find that people do cheat—not always in a way that
maximizes self-gain, but always in a way that, as they argue,
protects their cherished MSI. For example, the researchers find
that when dishonesty is framed in a way that makes a person
mindful of her moral self-standards, she refrains from cheating
in an effort to preserve her MSI. Mazar and colleagues argue
that prior theories of dishonesty have failed to account for the
value people place on maintaining their MSI, instead favoring a
viewpoint that emphasizes a cost-benefit analysis on the part of
the cheater. The researchers attempted to identify actual changes
to participants’ MSI by asking them about how moral they view
themselves to be, but these questions yielded no effects.
We see a similar emphasis on MSI as an explanatory
process in recent work that utilizes a cognitive dissonance
framing to explain the effects of behavior on people’s MSI
(Shalvi et al., 2015). Barkan et al. (2012) demonstrated that
having people contemplate their immoral misdeeds subsequently
lowered their state self-esteem (Heatherton and Polivy, 1991;
which then explained their greater willingness to punish and
negatively judge other wrong-doers). Across six studies, they
found that having people think about an unethical behavior that
produced guilt, shame, or regret led participants’ to report lower
general self-images (compared to recalling neutral or favorable
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situations about the self). However, the authors also found that
recalling a domain-general personal failure or an amoral behavior
that elicited cognitive dissonance produced the same lowered
state self-esteem. We suspect that had the authors specifically
measured participants’MSI, changes would have only occurred in
response to the immoral recall (see Studies 4 and 5 in the current
manuscript for support for this supposition).
Lastly, Monin and Jordan (2009) discussed the emergence of a
construct that captured the dynamics of the moral self. In their
theoretical piece they discuss “a view of the self that is more
reflective and more labile—one’s moment to moment question
of ‘How moral am I?”’ (p. 347), a question that they say people
constantly strive to answer favorably. They explicitly call for a
tool to measure the mechanism between an individual and his
or her behavior, saying that understanding the dynamics of the
moral self will “broad[en] the scope of phenomena that can be
studied” (p. 348).
The literature reviewed above proposes the dynamics of the
MSI as a mechanism for the dynamics of moral and immoral
behavior. Yet because no tool is provided to empirically measure
the state of the moral self and its dynamics, these assertions
lack empirical evidence. One exception is a recent paper by
Cornelissen et al. (2013), who found that when people were
asked to recall a behavior they had performed that had a moral
or immoral outcome, they compensated in their dishonesty—
that is, they were more likely to cheat on a subsequent task
(Mazar et al., 2008). This moral compensation was explained
by differences in participants’ MSI, which were measured using
the scale proposed in the current investigation. More specifically,
they used our scale2 to demonstrate that the rise inMSI following
a moral behavioral recall and the lowering of MSI following an
immoral behavioral recall explained the magnitude of people’s
subsequent cheating behavior (i.e., more aftermoral behavior and
less after immoral behavior). However, it is important to note that
they did not demonstrate that (im)moral action recalls changed
people’s MSI from a baseline, a proposition that is central to our
current theoretical argument. Our goal is to provide a theoretical
foundation and empirically-driven examination of the MSI.
THE MSI AND THE SELF
We propose that the MSI resides in individuals’ working self-
concept, or current self-appraisal (Kernis and Johnson, 1990).
The working self-concept is a malleable part of the self, which
differentiates it from similar, more stable constructs, such as
self-esteem (Rosenberg, 1965) and moral identity (Aquino and
Reed, 2002). Like other areas of the working self-concept, people
evaluate the state of their moral selves and attach either negative
or positive labels to it based on cues from the social world
and their own actions (Kernis and Goldman, 2003). Also like
other parts of the working self-concept, the MSI is completely
subjective, meaning that it is not a measure of the strength of
one’s moral judgments (Kohlberg, 1994), nor does it measure how
2Cornelissen and colleagues cited an earlier version of this manuscript, which
had been presented at the Association for Consumer Research conference in St.
Louis, MI in 2011: Rules or Consequences? The Role of Ethical Mind-Sets in Moral
Dynamics.
moral (or immoral) a person actually is, but rather how moral
(or immoral) she thinks she is. To take an extreme example, a
devoutly religious person who dedicates his life to working with
underprivileged children in the inner city might have a lowerMSI
following a spat with a fellow driver than a solipsistic investment
banker who just made a small charitable donation following a
similar argument. Though, individuals may vary in terms of how
highly they value their moral selves, in general (see Aquino and
Reed, 2002) people share a fairly universal desire to be moral
(Dunning, 2007; Reed et al., 2007)—at least in terms of their
self-perceptions of such morality (Mazar et al., 2008).
We defineMSI as a person’s malleable moral self-concept, that
is, their self-concept related to the traits of the prototypically
moral person (i.e., caring, compassionate, helpful, hard-working,
friendly, fair, generous, honest, and kind)—derived from Aquino
and Reed’s (2002) work on the moral identity. While these nine
traits are not expected to be an exhaustive representation of the
traits of the moral prototype, we use these traits to evoke the
mental representation of people’s MSI. Below, we explain how the
proposed construct of the MSI is associated with (and yet distinct
from) other theoretically-related constructs.
Moral Identity
The MSI is distinct from moral identity in both its stability, as
well as its implications for and responses to moral behaviors.
Defined as “a self-conception organized around a set of moral
traits” (Aquino and Reed, 2002, p. 1424), moral identity
is comprised of an internalization subdimension, which is
the importance to the self of possessing such traits, and
a symbolization subdimension, which is the importance of
demonstrating to others that one possesses those traits through
one’s behavior, style of dress, et cetera. Like the MSI, one’s moral
identity is conceptualized as a self-regulatory mechanism and is
associated with various beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors (Aquino
and Reed, 2002). But unlike the MSI, moral identity is a relatively
stable trait (Aquino et al., 2009): “The definition of moral identity
proposed here implies that if the identity is deeply linked to a
person’s self-conception, it tends to be relatively stable over time”
(Aquino and Reed, 2002, p. 1425). If moral identity is highly
regarded by the individual, it is predicted to lead to consistent
moral actions throughout his or her life (Damon and Hart, 1992;
Aquino and Reed, 2002). By contrast, the MSI is theorized to
respond to events with a moral component, with a weak MSI
stimulating moral action and a strong MSI allowing for moral
relaxation (Cornelissen et al., 2013). Taken together, although
the MSI is based on the moral traits identified by Aquino and
Reed (2002), the MSI focuses on one’s perception of how they are
performing vis a vis these traits at a given moment, but not does
not measure the extent to which a person values the moral traits
(MI-internalization dimension) nor wishes to demonstrate them
to others (MI-symbolization).
Self-Esteem
A vast amount of research exists on self-esteem (e.g., Deci and
Ryan, 1995; Greenwald and Farnham, 2000; Crocker and Wolfe,
2001), which is defined as a person’s global feelings of self-worth
(Kernis and Goldman, 2003). Although, a person’s self-esteem
can change, it is unlikely to change in response to a single event
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or within a short period of time. Any instability in self-esteem
usually occurs over an extended period (Rosenberg, 1986)—for
example, from elementary to high school (e.g., McCarthy and
Hoge, 1982). Distinctions have been made between global self-
esteem and specific self-appraisals (similar to the MSI). Global
self-esteem tends to be based on a generalized emotional response
to the social world, whereas self-appraisals involve the cognitive
appraisal of one’s performance or acumen in some domain
(Brown, 1993). While self-appraisals can influence self-esteem
if they represent a core dimension of one’s self-concept (Kernis
et al., 1993; Pelham, 1995), global self-esteem andMSI differ from
each other in three key ways: (1) self-esteem concerns a person’s
global feelings of self-worth rather than his or her specific moral
self-appraisals, (2) self-esteem is relatively stable, and (3) self-
esteem is more of an emotional than a cognitive response to the
social world.
A more dynamic variation of self-esteem is state self-
esteem, which is defined as a person’s momentary assessment
of self-regard. State self-esteem contains three sub-dimensions:
performance (i.e., concern about one’s abilities), social (i.e.,
concern about how others see oneself), and appearance (i.e.,
concern about how one physically appears; Heatherton and
Polivy, 1991). Similar to our theorizing about the MSI, state self-
esteem is affected by the environment. For example, Heatherton
and Polivy (1991) find that state self-esteem decreases from
a baseline following feedback about failure on an intellectual
task and increases with interventions aimed at improving self-
esteem. However, state self-esteem encompasses people’s general
feelings of self-worth rather than their specific feelings about
their self-worth in the moral domain. Similar to the self-appraisal
reasoning described above, we expect that while one’s MSI would
be likely to affect one’s state self-esteem, the opposite is unlikely
to be the case (i.e., one’s general feeling of self-worth would not
affect one’s MSI).
Actual, Ought, and Ideal Selves
Self-discrepancy theory postulates that individuals have three
“selves”: the actual self, or the person one is perceived to be, the
ideal self, or the person one would like to be, and the ought self, or
the person one should be (Higgins, 1987). These latter two selves
are referred to as the “self-guides,” for they are thought to guide
people’s behavior and the nature of their self-assessments. Self-
discrepancy theory contends that people are motivated to reach
a state where their perceived actual self matches one of these
self-guides. It also contends that discrepancies between what a
person perceives to be his or her actual self and either the ideal
or ought self lead to various types of negative emotions and
discomfort. Despite apparent similarities, the construct of the
MSI differs from self-discrepancy theory in two key ways. First,
self-discrepancy theory concerns one’s general self-assessment
across domains rather than one’s specific self-assessment in the
moral domain (i.e., to measure one’s self-discrepancy, people are
asked to generate attributes related to each of the three selves).
Second, self-discrepancy theory places significant importance
on the source of the self view, proposing that each of these
three selves are derived from either one’s own self view or the
individual’s perception of how others perceive them (e.g., you
have both the ought self that you perceive and an ought self that
you think others perceive of you; see Higgins, 1987) and that the
source of the self view is important because it affects the type of
negative emotions or discomfort that results from discrepancies
with the actual self. The MSI does not distinguish between the
source of one’s self-perceptions, as we contend that one’s self-
perceptions are a reflection of both one’s own perceptions and the
perceived perceptions of others. We also contend that the MSI is
not exclusively derived from one of the two self-guides. Research
on morality suggests that our moral standards come from a mix
of the “oughts”—that is, the societally-dictated idea of what we
should be (Kohlberg, 1971; Hoffman, 1975)—and “ideals,” that is,
the what we (or others) would like ourselves to possess (Lapsley
and Lasky, 2001; Monin and Jordan, 2009; Jordan et al., 2011).
While we believe that the MSI comes from a combination of
the ideal and ought selves and assert that both the ideal and
ought are influential self guides, we argue that one’s personal ideal
self-standards are more relevant to the MSI than are standards
derived from the surrounding social context. Supporting this
assertion is fundamental research on identity, which suggests
that the self-concept is derived from the actual and ideal selves
(Wylie, 1974), as well as research on self-esteem (a construct
that we theorize and demonstrate is related to the MSI) which
has been empirically associated with actual-ideal discrepancies
but not actual-ought discrepancies (Moretti and Higgins, 1990).
We address the distinction between the MSI and self-discrepancy
theory both theoretically and empirically in Study 2.
THE CURRENT RESEARCH
Across five studies, we aim to formally present an instrument
to measure the dynamics of people’s moral selves, as well as to
demonstrate its malleability in response to moral and immoral
events. Study 1 demonstrates the convergent and discriminant
validity of the MSI scale with other theoretically-related scales.
Study 2 examines how the MSI is related to the ideal versus the
ought self (Higgins, 1987). Studies 3 through 5 demonstrate the
construct validity of the MSI, by demonstrating the malleability
of thismeasure based on various events (i.e., feedback-related and
self-related recalls). Study 3 looks at feedback related to social
comparisons of moral behavior, and Study 4 examines feedback
relative to one’s own moral ideal. Lastly, Study 5 provides
evidence that recall of one’s moral or immoral behavior affects
subsequent immoral behavior (Cornelissen et al., 2013), altering
MSI in the predicted directions3.
STUDY 1
Across two samples (1a and 1b), we compare our MSI
measure with measures of theoretically-related constructs,
including Moral Identity (Aquino and Reed, 2002), Generalized
Self-esteem (Rosenberg, 1965), Moral Disengagement (Moore
3The procedures for all five studies in this manuscript received approval from an
institutional review board prior to data collection. All procedures complied with
the rules regarding conducting research with human subjects proposed by the
American Psychological Association.
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et al., 2012), Religiosity (Brown, 1962), Negative Reciprocity
Norm (Eisenberger et al., 2004), and Sympathy (Ahmed and
Jackson, 1979). We explain each of these constructs and their
accompanying scales, as well as our hypothesized relationships
with these constructs below.
Moral Self-Image
We measured MSI by presenting nine traits perceived as
prototypical of the ideally-moral person (Aquino and Reed,
2002). Using a nine-point Likert Scale (1 = much less than the
X person I want to be; 9=much more than the X person I want to
be), we asked people to indicate where they were relative to their
ideal self on each trait; see Supplementary Material.
Moral Identity
Moral identity is defined as having a self-conception organized
around a set of moral traits. Moral identity possesses two
dimensions, internalization and symbolization. Internalization
is the importance people place on possessing these traits, and
symbolism is the importance they place on demonstrating these
traits to others (e.g., through membership in clubs or the
clothes they wear). For example, an internalization item is,
“It would make me feel good to be a person who has these
characteristics,” whereas a symbolization item is, “I am actively
involved in activities that communicate to others that I have these
characteristics.” Using the Aquino and Reed (2002) 10-item scale
(1= completely disagree; 7= completely agree), wemeasured both
dimensions and had divergent predictions for each. Previous
research has demonstrated that past moral actions affect the
symbolic but not the internalized moral identity (Jordan et al.,
2011) and that, instead, the internalized moral identity affects
how people behaviorally respond to immoral events (Mulder
and Aquino, 2013). Thus, we hypothesized that while one’s MSI
would not be affected by the importance one places on possessing
moral traits (internalization), it would be (positively) affected by
the extent to which one demonstrates the moral self to others
(symbolization), as such public demonstrations would boost
people’s conceptions of their moral selves.
Generalized Self-Esteem
Generalized self-esteem is defined as a person’s global feelings
of self-worth and -acceptance. We measured self-esteem using
Rosenberg’s (1965) 10-item measure. Items included, “On a
whole, I am satisfied with myself,” and “At times, I think I am no
good at all (reverse-scored)” (1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly
agree). Although, self-esteem is considered a stable construct and
MSI is considered a malleable construct, we predicted a positive
relationship between MSI and generalized self-esteem, given that
temporary self-appraisals have been found to be predictive of
global self-esteem, particularly when these self-appraisals are a
part of the self that the person considers central or core (see
Kernis et al., 1993; Pelham, 1995).
Moral Disengagement
Moral disengagement is defined as, “an individual’s propensity
to evoke cognitions which restructure one’s actions to appear
less harmful, minimize one’s understanding of responsibility
for one’s actions, or attenuate the perceptions of the distress
one causes to others” (Moore, 2008, p. 129). In other words,
moral disengagement is a person’s ability to rationalize his
or her immoral behavior in a way that helps reduce the
negative feelings that would otherwise result. We measured
moral disengagement using the eight-item Propensity to Morally
Disengage Scale (Moore et al., 2012), which included, “People
shouldn’t be blamed for doing things that are technically
wrong when all their friends are doing it too,” and “Some
people have to be treated roughly because they lack feelings
that can be hurt” (1 = not at all; 7 = very much so).
We predicted that moral disengagement would be positively
related to MSI because the more one is able to morally
disengage from one’s immoral actions, the greater one’s
MSI.
Religiosity
Religiosity is defined as the extent to which a person holds
various religious beliefs. We measured religiosity using the
Other Orthodox Christian Beliefs subscale of Brown’s (1962)
Religiosity measure. Intuitively, religiosity may be related to the
perception of oneself as moral; indeed, religiosity and people’s
desire to symbolize their moral self to others have been found
to be positively correlated (Aquino and Reed, 2002). Thus, we
hypothesized a positive relationship between religiosity and MSI.
Negative Reciprocity Norm
The negative reciprocity norm is the belief that it is appropriate
to retaliate against an immoral or unjust act leveled against
oneself (Gouldner, 1960). We measured this construct using the
nine-item scale of Eisenberger et al. (2004), which included, “If
someone says something nasty to you, you should say something
nasty back” and “If someone treats you badly, you should
treat that person badly in return” (1 = not at all; 7 = very
much so). The negative reciprocity norm has been found to be
negatively related to the extent to which a person considers
moral traits central to his or her self-concept (Aquino and
Reed, 2002). As the MSI focuses on an assessment of the state
of one’s moral-self rather than how much one values a moral
identity (which would likely be associated with someone’s desire
to retaliate for an act perceived as unjust), we did not expect
any relationship between MSI and holding a norm of negative
reciprocity.
Sympathy
Sympathy is the ability to show concern for the needs and welfare
of others (Eisenberg, 2000). We measured sympathy with the
eight-item nurturance dimension of the Acceptance of Welfare
scale (Ahmed and Jackson, 1979), which included, “Someone
who is disabled will get my attention and aid” and “People in need
deserve my sympathy and support” (1 = strongly disagree; 7 =
strongly agree). Similar to the rationale behind our predictions
for Negative Reciprocity Norm, we predicted a null relationship
between MSI and Sympathy. The state of one’s MSI should be
unrelated to one’s general beliefs about showing sympathy for
those less fortunate.
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Positive and Negative Affect
In Sample 1b only we examined positive and negative affect
because we wished to see how the state of the MSI related
to individuals’ affective states. We administered the PANAS
(Watson et al., 1988), which presented participants with 10
positive (e.g., proud, active) and 10 negative (e.g., upset,
nervous) items and asked them to rate themselves on each
item based on how they were feeling at the current moment
(1 = not at all; 7 = very much so). As the PANAS
measures a state-based construct (similar to the MSI), and
because people’s moral selves are an integral part of their
self-concepts, we predicted that the MSI would be positively
related to positive affect and negatively related to negative
affect.
Gender and Age
While there is some evidence that women reason differently
(Jaffee andHyde, 2000) and perhapsmore complexly aboutmoral
issues thanmen (Wark and Krebs, 1996;White, 1999), there is no
evidence to suggest that women think of themselves as any more
or less moral then men. Similarly, there is evidence that moral
behavior changes from adolescence into adulthood but is fairly
stable in adulthood (Eisenberg et al., 2005), the age category of
our samples. Thus, we predicted null relationships between MSI
and both the demographic variables of age and gender.
Participants—Sample 1a
Participants were 574 American adults from a Mechanical Turk
(Mturk) sample (Mage = 32.89, SD = 11.04, 48% female). They
were invited to take part in a 20-min study in exchange for $0.55.
Thirty participants did not pass the attention checks and thus
were eliminated from the analyses, leaving a final sample of 544
on which to run the analyses.
Participants—Sample 1b
Participants were 515 American adults from an Mturk sample
(Mage = 31.88, SD = 8.57, 49% female). They were invited
to take part in a 20-min study in exchange for $0.60. Sixteen
participants did not pass the attention checks and thus were
eliminated from the analyses, leaving a final sample of 499 on
which to run the analyses.
Procedures
Participants read a consent form and, if they agreed to the terms,
logged on to the study website. They completed all measures
(with the NRN and Sympathy scales only in Sample 1a and the
PANAs only in Sample 1b) stated above in a randomized order;
however, either the MSI scale or the moral identity scale always
came first.
Results and Discussion
All results (including Cronbach Alphas for the measures) are
contained in Tables 1, 2.
Demonstrating convergent validity, across both samples, MSI
was positively related to symbolic (but not internalized) moral
identity, generalized self-esteem, moral disengagement, and
religiosity; also as predicted, demonstrating divergent validity,
we found no relationship between MSI and negative reciprocity
norms and sympathy. However, in contrast to predictions,
we found that in Sample 1a (but not 1b) age was positively
related to MSI, with older individuals having higher MSIs
than younger individuals. In Sample 1a gender was marginally
negatively related to MSI, with women reporting higher MSIs
than men; however in Sample 1b the directionality of this
relationship flipped such that men reported higher MSIs than
women.
We then conducted an exploratory factor analysis to explore
the factor structure of our MSI scale, predicting that a single
factor would emerge from the data. We conducted a principal
components analysis with an oblique rotation method, which
would allow for the potential factors to be correlated with one
another (direct oblimin). From an inspection of the scree plot,
eigenvalues, and factor loadings across both samples, only one
factor (Sample 1a: Eigenvalue = 4.48; Sample 1b: Eigenvalue =
4.68) emerged from the data. This factor explained between
51.96% (1a) and 52.37% (1b) of the variance, and all items
loaded on to this factor at a loading of 0.53 (How hardworking
TABLE 1 | Study 1 Sample 1a—Scale intercorrelations and reliabilities.
MSI MIs MIi GSE MD RELIG NRN SYMP Age Sex
MSI 0.88
MIs 0.26*** 0.83
MIi 0.03 0.29*** 0.84
GSE 0.20*** 0.17*** 0.26*** 0.93
MD 0.15*** 0.001 −0.44*** −0.18*** 0.84
RELIG 0.17*** 0.25*** 0.14*** 0.11** 0.009 0.87
NRN 0.05 −0.19*** −0.37** −0.14*** 0.55*** −0.09* 0.86
SYMP 0.03 0.26*** 0.63** 0.26*** −0.51*** 0.12** −0.48*** 0.95
Age 0.09* −0.02 0.16*** 0.21*** −0.22*** 0.14*** −0.12** 0.13** −
Sex −0.06† −0.11** −0.23*** −0.02 0.25*** −0.13** 0.19*** −0.17*** −0.17*** −
Cronbach alphas contained in the diagonals. †p< 0.10; *p ≤ 0.05; **p ≤ 0.01; ***p ≤ 0.001. MSI, moral self-image; MIs, moral identity–symbolization; MIi, moral identity–internalization;
GSE, generalized self-esteem; MD, moral disengagement; RELIG, religiosity; NRN, negative reciprocity norm; SYMP, sympathy. For gender, 1, female; 2, male.
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TABLE 2 | Study 1 Sample 1b—Scale intercorrelations and reliabilities.
MSI MIs MIi GSE MD RELIG PANAS-P PANAS-N Age Gender
MSI 0.88
MIs 0.23*** 0.85
MIi −0.07 0.38*** 0.82
GSE 0.31*** 0.23*** 0.22*** 0.94
MD 0.15*** −0.05 −0.46*** −0.16** 0.84
RELIG 0.14** 0.30*** 0.25*** 0.13** −0.03 0.90
PANAS-P 0.32*** 0.36*** 0.17*** 0.50*** 0.02 0.27*** 0.92
PANAS-N −0.01 −0.08† −0.31*** −0.39*** 0.32*** −0.02 −0.04 0.92
Age 0.06 0.00 0.11* 0.18*** −0.20*** 0.14** 0.16*** −0.13** −
Gender 0.09* −0.10* −0.22*** 0.04 0.18*** −0.14** 0.03 0.05 −0.14** −
Cronbach alphas contained in the diagonals. †p < 0.10; *p ≤ 0.05; **p ≤ 0.01; ***p ≤ 0.001. MSI, moral self-image; MIs, moral identity–symbolization; MIi, moral identity–internalization;
GSE, generalized self-esteem; MD, moral disengagement; RELIG, religiosity; PANAS-P, PANAS positive affect; PANAS-N, PANAS negative affect. For gender, 1, female; 2, male.
are you relative to your ideal?) or higher4. In sum, across
Samples 1a and 1b, we found that MSI was positively related to
symbolic moral identity, generalized self-esteem, and religiosity
and negatively related to moral disengagement. We also found
that our scale contained a single factor structure, which explained
at least 50% of the variance across both studies. These findings
provide suggestive evidence of the validity of MSI as a unique
construct.
STUDY 2
In Study 2, we examine how the MSI is related to the ideal versus
ought self (Higgins, 1987). As noted earlier in the Introduction,
4We also ran CFAs across Samples 1a and 1b. Specifically, to examine the
veracity of our proposed model related to other plausible models, we used
the confirmatory factor analysis function of LISREL 8.80 maximum likelihood
estimation method. Model fit was assessed by the Root Mean Square Error of
Approximation (RMSEA), the Normed-fit Index (NFI), and the Comparative Fit
Index (CFI). In addition, competing models were compared to our proposed
model by means of chi-square differences. For Sample 1a, in which we compared
our proposed model in which MSI, the symbolic and internalized sub-dimensions
of moral identity, general self-esteem, moral disengagement, sympathy, negative
reciprocity norms, and religiosity were analyzed as distinct factors with three other
models in which symbolic moral identity and generalized self-esteem, and moral
disengagement were loaded on to the same factor as MSI. The eight-factor model
demonstrated better fit [χ2(1924)=5519.58; RMSEA= 0.059 (0.057, 0.060); NFI=
0.93; CFI= 0.96] than all three other models [7-factor:1χ2(7) = 1721.13; RMSEA
= 0.071 (0.069, 0.073); NFI = 0.92; CFI = 0.95; 6-factor: 1χ2(13) = 10,878.27;
RMSEA = 0.12 (0.12, 0.12); NFI = 0.88; CFI = 0.91; 5-factor: 1χ2(18) =
10,847.16; RMSEA = 0.12 (0.12, 0.12); NFI = 0.87; CFI = 0.90]. Similarly, for
Sample 1b we compared an 8-factor model, which examined theMSI, the symbolic
and internalized sub-dimensions of moral identity, generalized self-esteem, moral
disengagement, religiosity, and positive and negative affect as distinct factors with
five other models in which the MSI was loaded on to factor along with symbolic
moral identity, generalized self-esteem, and positive affect. The 8-factor model
demonstrated better fit [χ2(1741) = 4588.07; RMSEA = 0.057 (0.055, 0.059);
NFI = 0.95; CFI = 0.95] than all comparison models [7-factor with MSI and
symbolic MI loaded together: 1χ2(7) = 1769.47; RMSEA = 0.073 (0.071, 0.075);
NFI = 0.90; CFI = 0.93; 7-factor with MSI and generalized self-esteem loaded
together:1χ2(7) = 3774.63; RMSEA = 0.087 (0.085, 0.089); NFI = 0.89; CFI =
0.92; 7-factor model with MSI and positive affect loaded together:1χ2(7) =
3417.13; RMSEA = 0.085 (0.083, 0.087); NFI = 0.92; CFI = 0.92; 6-factor model:
1χ2(13) = 5721.57; RMSEA= 0.99 (0.97, 0.10); NFI = 0.89; CFI = 0.90; 5-factor
model:1χ2(18)= 10778.19; RMSEA= 0.12 (0.12, 0.13); NFI= 0.86; CFI= 0.86].
self-discrepancy theory postulates that individuals have the actual
self and two “self-guides,” including the ought self and the ideal
self (Higgins, 1987). Self-discrepancy theory argues that people
are motivated to align their perceived actual self with one of
these self-guides and that discrepancies between the actual self
and either the ought or ideal self lead to negative emotions
and discomfort. As argued above, we propose that the MSI is
primarily comprised of one’s perceived moral self relative to
one’s own moral ideal self-standard rather than relative to an
externally-imposed standard (i.e., the ought). That is, the MSI
assesses who a person perceives him or herself to be relative to
the ideal moral person that he or she wishes to be—not the moral
person he or she thinks others wish him or herself to be. This
contention is derived from research demonstrating that moral
or immoral behaviors do not need to be witnessed by others in
order to elicit compensatory effects; only the individual him or
herself needs to be aware of the event (Sachdeva et al., 2009;
Jordan et al., 2011), as well as research suggesting that the self
concept is comprised of a mix of actual and ideal states (Wylie,
1974).
In order to empirically test this idea, half of the participants
in the current study completed the MSI scale as it was originally
written (i.e., in a way that measured the ideal moral self). The
other half of participants completed a version of the scale in
which we asked people not about the moral self they perceived
themselves to possess relative to where they wanted to be (ideal)
but rather about the moral self they perceived themselves to
possess relative to what they thought others wanted them to
possess (ought). Along with one of these two versions of the scale,
participants also completed the same measures administered to
Sample 1b in Study 1.
Although, we contend that the ought self is relevant for the
MSI, we predicted that the ideal MSI would be a better fit than
the ought moral self with our proposed model.
Participants, Design, and Procedures
Participants were 590 American adults from an Mturk sample
(Mage = 35.94, SD = 11.34, 50.5% female). Participants were
invited to take part in a 15-min study in exchange for $0.75
compensation.
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TABLE 3 | Study 2—Scale intercorrelations and reliabilities for the Ideal moral self.
MSI MIs MIi GSE MD RELIG PANAS-P PANAS-N Age Gender
MSI 0.88
MIs 0.34*** 0.84
MIi 0.05 0.36*** 0.85
GSE 0.20*** 0.21*** 0.15** 0.93
MD 0.14* −0.02 −0.46*** −0.11† 0.81
RELIG 0.17** 0.30*** 0.30*** 0.08 −0.10† 0.89
PANAS-P 0.33*** 0.30*** 0.25*** 0.42*** −0.01 0.24*** 0.92
PANAS-N −0.03 0.05 −0.16** −0.26*** 0.31*** 0.02 −0.11 0.88
Age −0.03 0.004 0.15** 0.08*** −0.19*** 0.20*** 0.15** −0.08 −
Gender −0.03 −0.21*** −0.18** −0.06 0.20*** −0.18** 0.002 −0.03 −0.08 −
Cronbach alphas contained in the diagonals. †p < 0.10; *p ≤ 0.05; **p ≤ 0.01; ***p ≤ 0.001. MSI,moral self-image; MIs, moral identity–symbolization; MIi, moral identity–internalization;
GSE, generalized self-esteem; MD, moral disengagement; RELIG, religiosity; PANAS-P, PANAS positive affect; PANAS-N, PANAS negative affect. For gender, 1, female; 2, male.
Participants were randomly assigned to complete either the
MSI scale or a version of the MSI scale in which we asked
about their ought moral selves. Specifically, in the ought self
condition, instead of asking participants to indicate how caring,
compassionate, fair, et cetera he or she was at the present
time relative to the person who he or she wanted to be,
we phrased these items so that the participant was asked to
indicate how caring, compassionate, fair, et cetera he or she
was at the present time relative to who others wanted him
or her to be. All participants then completed measures of
moral identity (Aquino and Reed, 2002), generalized self-esteem
(Rosenberg, 1965), moral disengagement (Moore, 2008; Moore
et al., 2012), religiosity (Brown, 1962), and positive and negative
affect (Watson et al., 1988).
Results and Discussion
All results (including Cronbach Alphas for the measures) are
contained in Tables 3, 4.
For the MSI (i.e., the ideal moral self), all relationships
found in Study 1 (except for the relationship with gender) were
replicated in the current study. Specifically, demonstrating the
convergent validity of the proposed construct, MSI was positively
related to symbolic (but not internalized) moral identity,
generalized self-esteem, moral disengagement, religiosity, and
positive affect. And again, demonstrating the divergent validity of
the MSI with other constructs, we found no relationship between
the MSI and negative affect or age. In this study, there was no
relationship with gender.
In contrast, while several of the relationships found between
MSI and the other explored constructs were replicated when
using the ought version of the MSI scale, unlike the ideal MSI,
the ought version showed a moderate positive correlation with
the internalization subdimension of moral identity (Aquino and
Reed, 2002), no correlation with moral disengagement (Moore,
2008), and a positive correlation with generalized self-esteem
(Rosenberg, 1965), which was double the magnitude as witnessed
for the idealmoral self. We also saw a moderate-sized correlation
with gender, such that women reported having a greater moral
self as perceived by others.
Thus, it appears that except for the negative correlation
with negative affect, the ideal MSI more accurately captured
our hypothesized relationships with the predicted related (and
unrelated) constructs. To empirically test this assertion, we
used the confirmatory factor analysis function of LISREL
8.80 maximum likelihood estimation method to compare our
purported model using both the ideal MSI and the ought moral
self via assessing the chi-square differences between the two
models. As done in the previous studies, model fit was assessed
by the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA), the
Normed-fit Index (NFI), and the Comparative Fit Index (CFI).
The first model tested was the purported model in which
the (ideal) MSI, the symbolization and internalization sub-
dimensions of moral identity, generalized self-esteem, moral
disengagement, religiosity, and positive and negative affect were
analyzed as distinct factors. When using the idealMSI, this eight-
factor model had a good fit with the data, χ2(1801) = 3917.94;
RMSEA = 0.064 (0.061, 0.066); NFI = 0.87; CFI = 0.93. In
contrast, while the model using the ought MSI also showed
sufficient model fit, χ2(1801) = 3898.68; RMSEA= 0.063 (0.060,
0.065); NFI = 0.90; CFI = 0.95, it was inferior to the one using
the idealMSI,1χ2(1) = 19.26, p = 0.000015.
In sum, while we did find that the ought moral self showed
many of the same relationships as were found with the ideal
MSI, the ought moral self was strongly positively correlated with
individuals’ internalized moral identity, which is the more “trait-
like,” stable dimension of the two moral identity subdimensions
(Jordan et al., 2011). It was also strongly positively correlated
with the generalized self-esteem—a stable personality dimension.
Taken together, it appears that the ought moral self mimics more
of a stable, individual difference than does the ideal MSI. As
stated earlier, we see the MSI not as being a stable, individual
difference but as a state that responds to people’s moral actions
and social comparisons to the world around them. More research
is required to make statements about the stability of the ought
moral self with confidence.
5Although, the degrees of freedom were equivalent for both models, you cannot
test the significance of a chi-square value with a degrees of freedom equal to 0.
Thus, we set this to “1,” which is a conservative test of our hypothesis.
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TABLE 4 | Study 2—Scale intercorrelations and reliabilities for the Ought moral self.
MSI MIs MIi GSE MD RELIG PANAS-P PANAS-N Age Gender
MSI 0.91
MIs 0.42*** 0.87
MIi 0.41*** 0.33*** 0.87
GSE 0.40*** 0.26*** 0.25*** 0.94
MD -0.10 0.05 −0.48*** −0.24*** 0.84
RELIG 0.22*** 0.23*** 0.018** 0.11† 0.04 0.89
PANAS-P 0.39*** 0.37*** 0.21*** 0.42*** 0.03 0.22*** 0.93
PANAS-N −0.16** −0.06 −0.38*** −0.36*** 0.42*** 0.01 0.02 0.90
Age 0.08 −0.04 0.14** 0.04 −0.16** 0.14** 0.05 −0.10 −
Gender −0.19** −0.18** −0.30*** −0.09 0.23*** −0.30*** −0.05 0.08 −0.13* −
Cronbach alphas contained in the diagonals. Correlations that are bolded are those in which the relationship differed between the ought and the ideal moral self. †p < 0.10; *p ≤ 0.05;
**p ≤ 0.01; ***p ≤ 0.001. MSI, moral self-image; MIs, moral identity–symbolization; MIi, moral identity–internalization; GSE, generalized self-esteem; MD, moral disengagement; RELIG,
religiosity; PANAS-P, PANAS positive affect; PANAS-N, PANAS negative affect. For gender, 1, female; 2, male.
Unlike the ideal MSI, the ought moral self was negatively
correlated with negative affect. This is a relationship that was
predicted for the ideal moral self but not witnessed in either
Studies 1b or Study 2. Why this is is unknown. Perhaps, as highly
social beings (Aronson, 2003), thinking about how others see you
more strongly elicits negative emotions than does thinking about
one’s own moral self-evaluation. And lastly, we found that the
ought moral self was higher for females than for males. While
this was not hypothesized (nor found) for the ideal MSI, it was
found for the ideal moral self in Study 1’s Sample 1a. Why it
was not found in the current study is unknown. However, it is
unsurprising that women reported having a higher moral self as
conceived by others in their social world, as there is evidence that
society views women as being more moral and virtuous thanmen
(Fiske et al., 1999, 2002; White, 1999).
In Studies 3, 4, and 5 we examine a fundamental assertion
that underlies our theorizing about MSI, namely that the MSI
responds to explicit feedback about one’s moral state relative
to others and to one’s own moral ideal. Research on the self
demonstrates that the self-concept is influenced by three primary
sources originating in the social environment: social comparison,
feedback, and an individual’s actions (Kernis and Goldman,
2003). In Study 3, we explore the effect of the first of these
three sources, social comparison, on changes to a person’s MSI
(looking specifically at feedback in Study 4 and actions in Study
5). In Studies 4 and 5, in order to examine the independent
contribution of MSI, we then investigate whether such feedback
influences related constructs. Specifically, we investigate whether
such feedback not only affects the MSI but also moral identity
(Aquino and Reed, 2002), generalized self-esteem (Rosenberg,
1965), and state self-esteem (Heatherton and Polivy, 1991).
STUDY 3
In Study 3, we explore one of the primary sources of influence
originating in the social environment (Kernis and Goldman,
2003), social comparison information, and examine how it
influences the MSI. We predicted that the MSI would be affected
by this feedback with positive feedback leading to an increase in
one’s MSI and negative feedback leading to a decrease.
Participants and Design
Participants were 59 international business students (56%
women, Mage = 21.86, SD = 2.45) at a university in the
Netherlands who participated in exchange for e6. We presented
all materials in English and randomly assigned participants to
one of two moral-valence conditions: above average moral or
below average moral. Thirteen participants were excluded from
the analyses, leaving us with a total of 46 participants on which to
run the analyses6.
Procedures
Participants were required to complete our MSI scale at least 15 h
prior to coming into the lab. We sent them a link to the MSI scale
immediately after they had signed up for the study.
When the participants arrived in the lab, we told them
they would be completing a study about their environmental
conservation behavior. Participants were required to write a short
essay about, “what actions you take in support of environmental
conservation and why you think these are important.” We
used the topic of environmental conservation behavior because
previous research has found this topic to be related to people’s
moral selves (Mazar and Zhong, 2010). We told each participant
that the experimenter would interrupt him or her after several
minutes to obtain more information about the essay he or she
had just written. Before the experimenter came in, the computer
delivered a message to the participant. They were told that
the essay they had written was actually part of a standardized
measure of people’s “MIP,” or “how much moral traits are a part
of your identity and who you are.” We said that the measure
assessed both the vocabulary they used and the speed at which
they typed to generate a score that we could compare with the
6Six participants were excluded due to behavior during the lab session (e.g., could
not understand English or a fire alarm occurred in the middle of the session,
forcing the lab to be evacuated), three because they did not believe that the MIP
was a real test, and four because they took the post-test but did not take the pre-test.
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scores of others in the population. The experimenter then opened
the door and gave participants a sheet that further explained
this measure and the ranges of scores that were possible; these
ranges were presented in five categories ranging from a very low
moral self-identity to a very high one. The experimenter told
participants that he would type a personal code into the main
computer that would allow the participant to see his or her score.
He assured each participant that this score would only be visible
to the participant. Following this interaction, the participant saw
his or her score. This score fell into one of two categories: very
high or very low relative to the rest of the population. Each
score was accompanied by the percentiles of the population in
which they fell (e.g., 1st–11th percentile; 88–99th percentile),
hence providing a point of social comparison. The participant
then completed the MSI scale once again.
Before leaving the lab, we asked participants to indicate the
range their score fell into from a choice of five options. Finally,
they were fully debriefed, a process that included telling them that
the measure and associated feedback were completely bogus.
Results
Manipulation Checks
All participants selected the correct score range on the
manipulation check.
MSI
In order to analyze our hypothesis that feedback would be
directly related to a change in individuals’ MSI, we subtracted
their score on the pre-test from their score on the post-test (for
similar methods, see Heatherton and Polivy, 1991). In a case like
this, where a change score is used as the dependent, rather than
independent, variable, polynomial regression is not necessary nor
appropriate (see Edwards, 2002)7.
Participants in both the extremely positive (M = −0.25, SD =
0.76) and extremely negative (M = 0.22, SD = 1.19) conditions
began with equivalent MSIs, F(1, 44) = 2.65, p = 0.11. While
the post-test scores between the extremely positive (M = 0.01,
SD = 0.91) and extremely negative (M = 0.10, SD = 1.18)
conditions also did not differ by condition, F(1, 44) = 0.84,
p = 0.77, the change between the pre- and post-test did differ
by condition, F(1, 44) = 4.35, p = 0.04, η
2
= 0.09. Specifically,
those who received extremely positive feedback about the states
of their moral selves showed an increase between scores on the
pre- and post-test (M = 0.25, SD = 0.70), whereas those who
received extremely negative feedback about the states of their
moral selves showed a decrease between scores on the pre- and
post-test (M = −0.13, SD = 0.48).
Discussion
As predicted, we found that feedback regarding people’s moral
selves relative to others led to self-reported changes in their MSI.
People who were told they had a moral self that was extremely
above average had a positive change between pre- and post-
testing, whereas those who were told that they had a moral self
7Due to a programming error in which the pre-test was measured on a seven-point
scale and the post-test was measured on a nine-point scale, all MSI scores were
standardized prior to analyses.
that was extremely below average showed a negative change.
We wish to acknowledge that while the difference between the
two conditions for the pre-test scores was not significant, the
extremely positive condition did start at a lower point than the
extremely negative condition. This lower pre-test score increased
the chances that a mere regression to the mean would produce
MSI change scores that would increase for the former condition
more so than for the latter. In order to explore the robustness
of this effect more thoroughly, in the following two studies, we
examine the effects of two additional sources of self-image impact
on people’s MSI.
STUDY 4
In Study 4, we explore the effect of the second of the three
sources of impact to one’s self-concept (Kernis and Goldman,
2003), feedback, on changes to a person’s MSI (Kernis and
Johnson, 1990). Specifically, we examine how explicit feedback
about the state of one’s moral self relative to one’s own personal
ideal influences the MSI in both positive and negative ways.
To continue the investigation of discriminant validity, we also
examined the change in MSI relative to the change in other
potentially-related constructs. Specifically, consistent with our
argument that feedback about the moral self will only lead to
changes to the MSI, we also asked people to assess themselves
on four amoral traits (i.e., sporty, organized, smart, and sociable).
To rule out the possibility that our moral feedback changed
people’s general self-concept (rather than specifically their MSI),
we also examined how our feedback changed people’s generalized
(Rosenberg, 1965) and state self-esteem (Heatherton and Polivy,
1991). To investigate whether such feedback affected other
dimensions of the moral self, we also examined changes to
their moral identity (Aquino and Reed, 2002). We predicted
that changes following this feedback would only occur on one’s
MSI and not on the amoral control traits, self-esteem, or moral
identity.
Participants
Participants were 130 international business students (52%
female, Mage = 21.06, SD = 3.03) at a university in The
Netherlands who participated in exchange for e4. We presented
all materials in English. Fifteen participants were excluded from
the analyses8, leaving us with a working total of 115 participants.
Design and Procedures
We had three feedback conditions: meeting ideal moral self,
almost meeting ideal moral self, and a ways away from meeting
the ideal moral self. We chose these types of feedback because
they represented people’s achievement of their ideal moral self in
addition to being both close and far from this ideal state.
8Seven participants were excluded because they only took the post-test, one
because he/she only took the pre-test, one who took the pre-test after the post-test,
one who took the pre-test multiple times, one who’s pre-test to post-test difference
score was 8 standard deviations above the mean, and four people due to worrisome
behavior in the lab (e.g., could not understand the consent form in English, were
caught talking on their cell phones in the lab cubicle).
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TABLE 5 | Study 4—Pre- and Post-test scale intercorrelations and reliabilities.
MSI1 MIs1 MIi1 GSE1 SSE1 MSI2 MIs2 MIi2 GSE2 SSE2 Age Gender
MSI1 0.78
MIs1 0.29*** 0.75
MIi1 0.14 0.47*** 0.75
GSE1 −0.03 −0.07 0.004 0.85
SSE1 −0.02 −0.02 −0.08 0.70*** 0.86
MSI2 0.83*** 0.24** 0.06 0.08 0.04 0.89
MIs2 0.27** 0.80*** 0.42*** −0.02 −0.05 0.22* 0.82
MIi2 0.11 0.44*** 0.75*** −0.07 −0.16 0.03 0.50*** 0.82
GSE2 −0.02 −0.02 −0.06 0.86*** 0.71*** 0.02 0.04 −0.01 0.87
SSE2 −0.06 −0.04 −0.06 0.68*** 0.89*** −0.01 −0.03 −0.11 0.75*** 0.88
Age 0.19* 0.05 −0.02 −0.02 0.02 0.20* −0.02 0.02 −0.11 0.00 −
Gender −0.17† −0.13 −0.15 0.28*** 0.17† −0.13 −0.10 −0.13 0.27** 0.18* 0.04 −
Cronbach alphas contained in the diagonals. †p < 0.10; *p ≤ 0.05; **p ≤ 0.01; ***p ≤ 0.001. MSI, moral self-image; MIs, moral identity–symbolization; MIi, moral identity–internalization;
GSE, generalized self-esteem; SSE, state self-esteem. 1 indicates that it was taken in the pre-test. 2 indicates that it was taken in the post-test. For gender, 1, female; 2, male.
Participants were required to sign up for the study at least 20 h
ahead of their scheduled session. Immediately upon signing up,
we sent them a link to an online data collection site, where they
completed the pre-test measures: MSI, control trait ratings, moral
identity, generalized self-esteem, and state self-esteem. They had
to complete these measures at least 15 h in advance of their
session in order to participate in the laboratory portion of the
study.
Participants came into the lab at least 15 h after completing
the pre-test, ostensibly for a study on “e-tests.” They were first
asked a series of questions about their prosocial behavior and
asked to write an essay about what they do to help other people
in their daily lives. As in Study 2, we then told them that what
they actually just took was a measure called the “MIP,” which
along with the questions they answered online prior to coming
into the lab, indicates how close they are to meeting “the moral
self they ideally wish to be.” We then gave them both verbal and
graphic feedback about where they fell on this scale. Specifically,
participants were told that they met the moral self that they
aspire to be, have almost met the moral self that they aspire
to be, or were a ways away from meeting the moral self they
aspire to be, depending on their randomly-assigned condition.
We accompanied this feedback with diagrams to show how close
they were to their ideal moral self.
Participants then took all the pre-test measures a second time
and then were fully debriefed, which included being told that the
measure and associated feedback was completely bogus.
Results
All pre- and post-test correlations are contained in Table 5. The
correlations for the pre-test replicated those found in Study
1 (Samples 1a and 1b) and Study 2 for both the symbolic
(positive) and internalized (none) moral identity scores. They
also replicated the results found for Study 1 (Sample 1a) for
both gender (positive) and age (marginally negative). However,
surprisingly, the pre-test MSI was not correlated with generalized
self-esteem, as found in the previous studies.
As can be seen in Table 6, the MSI changed in the predicted
directions based on the feedback we provided, with the met
feedback raising people’s MSI between pre- and post-test and the
a ways away feedback lowering people’s MSI, F(2, 112) = 3.33,
p = 0.04, η2 = 0.06. However, this was not the case for symbolic
moral identity, F(2, 112) = 2.20, p = 0.12, generalized self-esteem,
F(2, 112) = 0.01, p = 0.99, state self-esteem, F(2, 112) = 1.41,
p = 0.25, and the amoral traits, F(2, 112) = 2.19, p = 0.12. And
counter to our predictions, our feedback affected internalized
moral identity, F(2, 112) = 3.52, p = 0.03, η
2
= 0.06, with those
receiving the almost met feedback showing an increase from pre-
to post-test and themet condition showing a decrease. There was
no significant difference between either of these two conditions
and the a ways away condition.
Discussion
As we predicted, telling people that they had achieved their ideal
moral selves led them to increase their MSI, whereas telling them
that they were a ways away from achieving their ideal moral
selves led them to decrease their MSI. This feedback did not affect
people’s ratings on the amoral traits, their general or state self-
esteem (which is in contrast to previous results, see Barkan et al.,
2012), nor their symbolic moral identity.
However, it did affect their internalized moral identity, an
unexpected finding both because internalized moral identity is
argued to be a stable trait (Aquino and Reed, 2002) and because it
has been found to be so in other research (e.g., Jordan et al., 2011).
We therefore did not predict that our feedback would change
ratings on this construct, which represents the importance that
people place on possessing moral traits. Participants placed more
importance on possessing moral traits when we told them that
they had almost reached their ideal moral selves than when we
told them that they had met their ideal moral selves. These
results could have been due to an aspiration-level phenomenon
(Zhang et al., 2007). In other words, people may have lowered the
importance of moral traits when they believed they had met the
goal and may have raised the importance when they were told
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TABLE 6 | Study 4—Pre- and Post-test scale means and change scores.
Measure Pre-test Post-test Met Condition Almost Met Condition A ways away Condition
mean (SD) mean (SD) mean (SD) mean (SD) mean (SD)
MSI 5.06 (0.80) 5.01 (0.90) 0.11a (0.46) −0.07a,b (0.51) −0.18b (0.51)
MIs 5.74 (0.83) 5.77 (0.83) −0.20 (0.60) −0.10 (0.66) 0.09 (0.64)
MIi 4.14 (1.02) 4.07 (1.03) −0.14a (0.59) 0.21b (0.66) 0.02a,b (0.47)
GSE 3.78 (0.57) 3.76 (0.56) −0.02 (0.26) −0.01 (0.27) −0.01 (0.37)
SSE 3.40 (0.49) 3.47 (0.50) 0.03 (0.26) 0.12 (0.22) 0.05 (0.22)
Control traits 4.52 (0.98) 4.53 (0.90) 0.04 (0.57) −0.12 (0.51) 0.12 (0.43)
MSI, moral self-image; MIs, moral identity–symbolization; MIi, moral identity–internalization; GSE, generalized self-esteem; SSE, state self-esteem. For those variables with a significant
omnibus ANOVA, means with different subscripts significantly differ at a p < 0.05.
that they were “almost there.” Future, research on the variance of
internalized moral identity should investigate this possibility.
As discussed earlier, in addition to feedback, people’s self-
concepts are influenced by their own actions (Kernis and
Goldman, 2003). As such, people’s MSI should also respond to
their moral actions and to their recalls about their moral actions
(Sachdeva et al., 2009; Jordan et al., 2011). Thus, the purpose of
Study 5 is to examine how recall of moral and immoral behavior
changes people’s MSI.
STUDY 5
Study 5 aimed to explore the third source of influence on one’s self
concept—an individual’s actions (Kernis and Goldman, 2003)—
by analyzing whether the recall of one’s (im)moral actions alters
one’s MSI. Cornelissen et al. (2013) used the current MSI scale to
demonstrate that the effects of recalling one’s (im)moral actions
on future immoral behavior can be explained by the state of
one’s MSI. Specifically, they asked people to recall a time when
they acted in a way that intentionally harmed another person
(immoral) or intentionally benefitted another person (moral).
They then had them engage in a task where they could cheat
for their own personal gain (adapted from Mazar et al., 2008)
and found that people who recalled harming another person
cheated on fewer tasks than those who recalled helping another
person and that these compensatory effects were explained
by the level of a person’s MSI, as measured by the current
scale9. This finding would suggest that the change to one’s MSI
caused by (im)moral actions explains people’s subsequent moral
compensation behavior.
However, and as noted before, although these authors used
the current scale to demonstrate this mediation, they did not
demonstrate that people’s MSI actually changed from a baseline;
they also did not compare that effect to other possible changes
in similarly related constructs10. Thus, in Study 4, we used
these exact recalls to examine how they changed people’s MSI
from a baseline level. We also included a control condition
9They also had people recall times when they violated or acted consistently with a
moral rule. These recalls did not lead to compensatory effects on immoral behavior
and the relationship was not mediated by the MSI.
10Note that the scale in the Cornelissen et al. (2013) paper was not created by these
authors themselves, but was the MSI scale presented in the current manuscript
(cited from a conference presentation of this scale; see Footnote 2).
to examine the directionality of the effects. We predicted that
whereas recalling an immoral action would lower people’s MSI,
recalling a moral action would raise people’s MSI.
Participants
Participants were 119 international business students (48%
female, Mage = 21.68, SD = 2.96) at a university in The
Netherlands who participated in exchange for e4. All materials
were presented in English. We excluded 12 people, leaving us
with a working total of 107 participants11.
Design and Procedures
We had two conditions that were identical to those used
by Cornelissen et al. (2013): recalling an intentional action
one engaged in that harmed another person or recalling an
intentional action one engaged in that benefitted another person.
For example, in the unethical condition, participants wrote about
behaviors such as borrowing money from another person and
then waiting until the other person likely had forgotten so that
he/she did not have to pay the person back, or delivering low-
quality work on a group project in the expectation that other
members would compensate for it. In the ethical condition,
participants wrote about behaviors such as loaning a friend
money that one had set aside for new clothes or joining a friend
for an event that the other person did not feel comfortable
attending alone despite being tired. We also included a control
condition in which participants were asked to recall their last visit
to the grocery store.
All other procedures were identical to those used in Study
4: participants were required to complete the pre-test measures
(i.e., MSI, control traits, moral identity, state self-esteem, and
generalized self-esteem) at least 15 h in advance of their session
in order to participate in the laboratory portion of the study. In
the laboratory session, they completed the recall task and then all
pre-test measures once again. Finally, they were fully debriefed.
Results
All pre- and post-test correlations are included in Table 7. The
correlations for the pre-test replicated those found in S1 (Samples
11Four participants were excluded because they did not take the pre-test, one
because he/she did not take the post-test, six people who took the pre-test
significantly less than 15 h before the post-test, and one person due to worrisome
behavior in the lab (i.e., read the study debriefing before going in for the post-test).
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TABLE 7 | Study 5—Pre- and Post-test scale intercorrelations and reliabilities.
MSI1 MIs1 MIi1 GSE1 SSE1 MSI2 MIs2 MIi2 GSE2 SSE2 Age Gender
MSI1 0.72
MIs1 0.32*** 0.64
MIi1 0.12 0.46*** 0.72
GSE1 0.09 0.04 −0.04 0.80
SSE1 −0.04 −0.02 −0.12 0.73*** 0.86
MSI2 0.75*** 0.35*** 0.25** 0.02 −0.03 0.79
MIs2 0.21** 0.78*** 0.49*** −0.06 −0.09 0.29** 0.76
MIi2 0.15 0.43*** 0.78*** −0.07 −0.14 0.24* 0.48*** 0.78
GSE2 0.00 −0.02 −0.02 0.86*** 0.73*** 0.04 −0.07 0.03 0.78
SSE2 −0.01 −0.03 −0.03 0.68*** 0.84*** −0.02 −0.07 −0.06 0.70*** 0.84
Age 0.01 −0.01 −0.02 −0.09 −0.07 0.02 0.08 0.08 −0.10 −0.09 −
Gender −0.02 0.04 −0.10 0.05 0.08 0.02 −0.02 −0.06 0.15 0.05 −0.01 −
Cronbach alphas contained in the diagonals. *p ≤ 0.05; **p ≤ 0.01; ***p ≤ 0.001. MSI, moral self-image; MIs, moral identity–symbolization; MIi, moral identity–internalization; GSE,
generalized self-esteem; SSE, state self-esteem. 1 indicates that it was taken in the pre-test. 2 indicates that it was taken in the post-test. For gender, 1, female; 2, male.
TABLE 8 | Study 5—Pre- and Post-test scale means and change scores.
Measure Pre-test Post-test Moral Condition Immoral Condition Control condition
mean (SD) mean (SD) mean (SD) mean (SD) mean (SD)
MSI 5.06 (0.73) 5.05 (0.76) 0.11a (0.40) −0.21b (0.59) −0.02a,b (0.55)
MIs 4.13 (0.94) 3.93 (0.90) −0.20 (0.61) −0.26 (0.60) −0.14 (0.63)
MIi 5.71 (0.72) 5.50 (0.84) −0.27 (0.60) −0.17 (0.38) −0.16 (0.59)
GSE 3.86 (0.50) 3.87 (0.46) −0.02 (0.26) 0.03 (0.24) 0.02 (0.29)
SSE 3.47 (0.47) 3.55 (0.43) 0.06 (0.26) 0.10 (0.26) 0.04 (0.25)
Control Traits 4.49 (0.97) 4.60 (0.91) 0.24 (0.51) −0.06 (0.59) 0.14 (0.83)
MSI, moral self-image; MIs, moral identity–symbolization; MIi, moral identity–internalization; GSE, generalized self-esteem; SSE, state self-esteem. For those variables with a significant
omnibus ANOVA, means with different subscripts significantly differ at a p < 0.05.
1a and 1b), Study 2, and Study 4 for both the symbolic (positive)
and internalized (none) moral identity scores. They, however,
failed to show any effects for either gender or age. And as
found in Study 4 (albeit not Study 1 or 2), the pre-test MSI was
not correlated with generalized self-esteem. We discuss possible
reasons for this in the General Discussion.
As can be seen in Table 8, the MSI changed in the predicted
directions based on people’s recalled situations, F(2, 103) = 3.79,
p = 0.03, η2 = 0.07: recalls of people’s moral actions led to
increases in their MSI, recalls of people’s immoral actions led to
decreases in their MSI, and the control recall led to virtually no
change. However, this was not the case for the moral identity
measure [both symbolic, F(2, 103) = 0.20, p = 0.70, and
internalized, F(2, 103) = 0.46, p = 0.64], generalized self-esteem,
F(2, 103) = 0.31, p = 0.73, state self-esteem, F(2, 103) = 0.48,
p = 0.62, and the control traits, F(2, 103) = 2.24, p = 0.11.
Discussion
The goal of Study 5 was to determine if the prompts used by
Cornelissen et al. (2013) that altered people’s immoral behavior
actually changed their MSI. We indeed found that the recall of
one’s (im)moral behavior changed one’s MSI in the predicted
directions. Also as predicted, this recall did not affect people’s
assessment on the control traits or their moral identities—
including their symbolic moral identity, internalized moral
identity (which is inconsistent with Study 4 but consistent with
initial predictions), state self-esteem (which, again, is inconsistent
with what previous research has found, see Barkan et al., 2012),
and generalized self-esteem.
These findings appear to be consistent with the theory of
moral compensation as symbolic self-completion (Zhong and
Liljenquist, 2006; Jordan et al., 2011). That is, moral actions (or
recalled moral actions) raise people’s MSI, thus allowing them
to relax their strivings on subsequent moral tasks. Similarly,
immoral actions (or recalled immoral actions) lower people’s
MSI, thus leading them to put greater effort into acting morally
on subsequent tasks (Sachdeva et al., 2009).
GENERAL DISCUSSION
While we have witnessed people’s moral inconsistencies both in
real life and experimental research (e.g., Monin and Miller, 2001;
Zhong and Liljenquist, 2006; Sachdeva et al., 2009; Jordan et al.,
2011), until now, there was no validated measure to empirically
examine the impact of these inconsistencies on people’s MSI nor
to examine the potential psychological processes driving these
inconsistencies. As we propose in the current manuscript, these
moral behaviors impact people’s MSI in positive and negative
ways. And as others have demonstrated (e.g., Cornelissen et al.,
2013), these effects on the MSI subsequently affect related moral
behaviors; in other words, MSI is a malleable construct that helps
explain (im)moral behavior, like generosity and dishonesty.
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This investigation accomplished two important objectives.
First, it developed a scale to measure the MSI and, in order to
investigate its convergent and discriminant validity, conceptually
and empirically compared it to related constructs, such as moral
identity (Aquino and Reed, 2002) and self-esteem (Rosenberg,
1965). Despite its theoretical relationship to both moral identity
and self-esteem, we found that the MSI was empirically
distinct from these constructs (Studies 1 and 2). It should be
acknowledged that we did not find a relationship between the
MSI and generalized self-esteem in either Study 4 or 5, which
is curious since we found a relationship in the previous three
studies in which generalized self-esteem was administered. A
potential reason for this may be the samples used. The studies in
which we found relationships between the MSI and generalized
self-esteem employed non-student American adult samples,
whereas those that did not, used Dutch student samples. It is
possible that that given the secularism ofWestern Europe (Berger
et al., 2008), Dutch students did not feel a connection between
the state of their MSI and their general self-image. It could
also be an age-related effect, such that in early adulthood, one’s
perceived moral state feels fairly isolated from his or her general
self-image. In order to understand these effects further, more in-
depth exploration of this issue is needed. Second, and relatedly,
while the MSI was affected by three sources of influence (Kernis
and Goldman, 2003)—social comparison, explicit feedback, and
one’s own behavior—this feedback did not affect these other
constructs (with the exception of internalized moral identity in
Study 4).
The current research also has implications outside the
laboratory. Specifically, it suggests that specific events and
feedback from the environment can affect people’s MSI. This
means that events in in the social world, such as reflecting on
one’s moral or immoral behavior during an interaction, can affect
how an individual perceives his or her moral self. It also means
that feedback about one’s moral or immoral behavior, which
routinely comes from experiences such as organizational, school,
or family life, can affect the state of one’s MSI.
Limitations and Future Directions
There are limitations of the current investigation that warrant
acknowledgment. First, in Study 4 we found an effect of feedback
on internalized moral identity; feedback that one had almost
reached one’s idealmoral self increased one’s reported importance
of possessing moral traits (i.e., internalized moral identity),
whereas feedback that one had met his or her ideal moral
self led the individual to decrease such reported importance.
This finding was unexpected given that prior research found
internalized moral identity to be a stable trait (Jordan et al.,
2011), and it is conceptualized as such (Aquino and Reed,
2002; Aquino et al., 2009). It is possible that the aspirational-
level phenomenon (Zhang et al., 2007) may explain this result;
however, more research is needed to investigate this and other
possible explanations, as we did not find this effect in Study 5.
Relatedly, in Studies 3 through 5, in which we either manipulated
feedback about people’s moral selves or allowed people to
reflect on their own moral behavior, we always placed the
MSI scale before the other scales, as observing changes to the
MSI constituted the main goal of these studies. Therefore, we
wished to minimize and distractions for participants between the
presentation of the manipulations and people’s ratings of their
moral selves. We acknowledge that this methodology may have
biased the results in favor of finding changes to people’s MSI
rather than to the scales that came later in the line-up (e.g., moral
identity or state self-esteem).
Second, it is possible that the traits we used to capture the
MSI were not traits that universally corresponded to people’s
conceptualization of the ideal moral person. For example, there
is evidence that the connection between work and morality is
specific to cultures with puritanical, Calvinist origins (Uhlmann
et al., 2011). Thus, the trait, hardworking, might not elicit a
prototype of the moral person equally across cultures. Therefore,
it is possible that not all people collectively viewed these nine
traits as equivalently referential to the moral self. While we
used diverse samples to demonstrate our results, from American
adults to international students, future research is needed to
understand cultural differences on the conceptualization ofmoral
prototypes.
Third, although the MSI is a state scale, we did not instruct
people to rate how they were feeling “right now”—that is, at
the current moment. Thus, it is possible, that some people rated
themselves on these traits based on how they felt about their
MSI, in general. However, results from Studies 3 through 5 did
demonstrate variance between pre- and post-tests of individuals’
MSI, suggesting that they were rating themselves based on
perceptions at the current moment. However, it also suggests
that leaving this phrasing out of the scale’s preamble meant that
our results served as a conservative test of our theory and that
bigger pre- to post-test discrepancies may have been found had
we emphasized the construct’s state nature in our phrasing. We
encourage future researchers using the MSI scale to experiment
with the use of the “right now” statement and explore how it
affects participants’ responses.
An additional future direction would be to investigate the
interaction between MSI and moral identity. There is suggestive
evidence that MSI might interact with moral identity to affect
people’s engagement in moral behavior. For example, it might
be that only when internalized moral identity is high (that is,
when a person highly values possessing moral traits) does a low
MSI prompt moral behavior in order to restore the moral self.
As Aquino et al. (2009) wrote, “someone whose self-definition
is organized around a set of moral traits should be motivated
to behave in a moral manner to maintain this self-conception”
(p. 124). They also hypothesized that people with a lower
internalized moral identity would not be prompted to show such
restorative behaviors. That said, there may be some empirical
difficulties in testing this hypothesis due to ceiling effects, as the
mean internalized moral identity is consistently found to be quite
high (e.g., a 4.6 on a five-point scale, Aquino and Reed, 2002, and
a 6.28 on a seven-point scale, Reed et al., 2007).
CONCLUSION
Thinking about countless societal examples, a person can be both
a pillar of the community and a thief, engaging in reflections
that likely both boost and lower the way she thinks about her
moral self. The current investigation demonstrates that the MSI
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is malleable and also presents a way to gauge this malleability
with the goal of providing researchers with a more nuanced
understanding of the intersection between the moral self and
moral behavior.
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